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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent Centurian Corporation (.referred 
to hereinafter as "plaintiff") brought this action alleging 
breach, by non-delivery, of an agreement for the purchase and 
sale of goods. Defendant-Respondent Fiberchem, Inc. (referred 
to hereinafter as "defendant") denied the making of the contract 
and asserted the defense of alter ego, alleging that the check 
delivered to it was for payment on the account of plaintiff's 
alter ego corporation, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson presiding, granted plaintiff judgment in the 
amount of $3,3 00.00 together with interest and costs. De-
fendant's defense of alter ego was held inapplicable, and 
its counterclaim was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an order of this Court vacating and 
reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1973, plaintiff Centurian Corporation 
delivered to defendant a check in the amount of $3,3 00.00. 
Plaintiff alleged, and through its president, Richard Nickles, 
testified that the check was issued to defendant for the pur-
chase of raw materials used in its boat manufacturing opera-
tion. 
Defendant denied the existence of a contract for the 
purchase and sale of goods; and through Fred Schwab, its 
branch manager, testified that the check was in payment of 
sums due defendant by Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and was 
intended by plaintiff as such. 
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was organized under the 
laws of the State of Utah in October of 1968 (R. 106, Ex. 
11-D)• From the time of its organization until its involun-
tary dissolution in 1974, Richard Nickles and his wife Mar-
garet Nickles were the sole shareholders, two of the three 
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directors and the primary officers of the company (Ex. 11-D). 
Plaintiff Centurian Corporation was organized under the laws 
of the State of Utah approximately nine months later, in 
August of 1969. Richard Nickles and his wife Margaret, to-
gether with her father, William Kaiser, were the sole share-
holders from the time of incorporation through the period 
material to this cause. Mr. and Mrs. Nickles served at all 
material times as two of the three directors, and served as 
the primary executive officers of the corporation (Ex. 12-D). 
Commencing some time in late 1968 or early 1969, the 
defendant, a wholesaler in materials used in boat manufactur-
ing, sold raw materials to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. This 
relationship between Fiberchem, Inc. as a supplier of raw ma-
terials and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and/or Centurian 
Corporation as purchasers existed until November of 1973 when 
Centurian Corporation made its last purchase. 
Plaintiff maintains that it purchased no raw mater-
ials from defendant until the litigated transaction of August 
1, 1973, and that all prior purchases were made by Centurian 
Custom Boats, Inc. Both plaintiff and defendant, however, 
maintained a flimsy and often inconsistent regard for the 
separation of the corporations as evidenced by invoices for 
materials designated at one time Centurian Corporation and at 
other times Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. (Exs. 23-25-D). The 
statement of accounts was maintained by defendant in the name 
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of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., although defendant was not 
aware until the filing of this action that two corporations 
actually existed. 
While it was contested below as to which corporation 
was actually purchasing the raw materials, the destruction 
of the boat manufacturing facility at 620 Wilmington Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, in January of 1972, brought an end to all 
purchases for a period of one year (Ex. 8-P). 
As of July 13, 1973, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. 
owed to defendant the sum of $3,313.15 on open account for 
the purchase of raw materials, primarily resins, coatings and 
fiberglass mats (Ex. 8-P). On August 1, 1973, plaintiff Cen-
turian Corporation issued defendant a check in the amount of 
$3,3 00.00 which defendant applied to the account of Centurian 
Custom Boats, Inc. to extinguish a long delinquent account 
(Ex. 8-P). Plaintiff, through Richard Nickles, testified 
that the check was issued for the purchase of raw materials 
which were never delivered by defendant. In November of 1973, 
notwithstanding the failure of delivery on the alleged August 
1 transaction, plaintiff purchased raw materials from defen-
dant totalling $851.95 (Ex. 5-P) on a C.O.D. basis and issued 
its check. On January 25, 1974, plaintiff made vague demand 
on defendant, presumably for the delivery of the goods speci-
fied in the August 1, 1973 transaction, although its written 
demand does not specify the goods in question (Ex. 13-D). 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO 
PLAINTIFF AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE 
OF ALTER EGO. 
This case involves the believability of witnesses, 
one produced by the plaintiff, Richard Nickles, and one by 
the defendant, Fred Schwab. The variances in testimony are 
so disparate as to cast grave doubt on the veracity of one 
or the other. But this matter exceeds the formal believabil-
ity of either on the question of whether a discussion took 
place forming a contract, but goes further and involves the 
conduct, actions and activities of two corporations, Centurian 
Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., both controlled 
by Richard Nickles. If, on the record and as a consequence 
of the trial court's findings that a contract was made, this 
Court cannot infringe the providence of the trier of fact, 
then the issue of alter ego and offset can be applied. That 
is that defendant has an admitted offset in the amount of 
$3,300.00 against Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., which corpor-
ation is the alter ego of plaintiff and must be offset against 
any sum due the plaintiff. 
The trial court's judgment for plaintiff was grounded 
on three principal findings: (1) that a contract existed 
between plaintiff and defendant for the purchase and sale of 
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goods; (2) that the contract was breached by defendant's 
failure to deliver those goods; and (3) that defendant, be-
cause of the grounds specified by the trial court in its 
memorandum decision (R. 55), could not assert a defense of 
alter ego and corresponding offset. 
Defendant, throughout the proceedings below, denied 
the making of the August 1, 1973 contract for the purchase 
and sale of goods and presented substantial evidence that Cen-
turian Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. were for 
all practical purposes the same entity, the corresponding 
alter ego of each. The trial court concluded the inapplica-
bility of the alter ego defense on four grounds which are 
either erroneous conclusions of law or irrelevant matters 
bearing on the legal issues of its defense. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND NO EVIDENCE 
OF TRICKERY OR FRAUD AND FURTHER ERRONEOUSLY HELD 
THAT DEFENDANT MUST ESTABLISH TRICKERY OR FRAUD IN 
ORDER TO ASSERT A DEFENSE OF ALTER EGO. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to demon-
strate that plaintiff, by and through Richard Nickles, its 
chief executive officer, has, since its inception, used the 
two corporate entities, Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Cen-
turian Corporation to avoid creditors, liability, and in gen-
eral to protect its assets. There is substantial evidence to 
demonstrate that plaintiff has engaged in a course of conduct 
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calculated to avoid the payment of the debt due defendant 
through the manipulation of the two corporations, 
Centurian Corporation asserted throughout the trial 
below that prior to the fire which destroyed its Wilmington 
manufacturing plant in January of 1912, it purchased no goods 
or materials from defendant, since it was only a holding com-
pany which either held real estate or purchased molds which 
it leased to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. Richard Nickles 
testified, although no documentary evidence was introduced, 
that corporate formalities were maintained by the corporations, 
The record of this case, together with the record of two other 
proceedings involving Centurian Corporation, shows that in 
fact Nickles represents the relationship between the corpor-
ations to suit the purposes of the particular case, and in 
this case his purpose was to defeat a just obligation that was 
owed to defendant* 
Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation was or-
ganized to hold real estate in 1969 (R. 111) and that in 1970 
it purchased molds from third parties ana leased those molds 
to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. (R. 112). All leases be-
tween the companies were lost in a fire in January, 1972, al-
though Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation maintained 
its offices at his home located elsewhere. Nickles further 
testified that Centurian Corporation did not manufacture, 
produce or own boats, that it bought no raw materials from 
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defendant at any time prior to August 1, 1973. In short, 
Centurian Corporation had no dealings with defendant. 
In another action, Scantlin v. Centurian Corpora-
tion, the record of which was admitted in this action as 
Exhibit 16-D, Nickles testified that Centurian Corporation 
in fact produced 85 to 90 boats in 1971 (Nickles deposition 
at 11, Ex. 16-D), and that Centurian Custom Boats manufac-
tured no boats in 1971 but only acted as the sales agent for 
Centurian Corporation. At the trial below Nickles explained 
this contradiction by saying that the reporter in the Scantlin 
case got the two companies mixed up, "an easy thing to do" 
(R. 131). 
In proceedings in the Federal District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division, (Centurian Corporation v. 
Transwestern General Agency, Civ. No. C--263, 1973), Centurian 
Corporation brought an action against its insurance carriers 
for the destruction of the manufacturing plant at 62 0 Wil-
mington and its contents (R. 120-128). The affidavit of 
Richard Nickles (Ex. 15-D) in support of Centurian Corpora-
tion's claim states that from August of 1969 until the fire 
in January of 197 2, Centurian Corporation manufactured boats. 
No mention is made of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. and Cen-
turian Custom Boats, Inc. made no claim for insurance pro-
ceeds. In the complaint filed in that proceeding (Ex. 22-D), 
plaintiff attached as an exhibit its accounts payable through 
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September 30, 1971, and detailed on the exhibit is a bal-
ance owing to defendant in the amount of $4,191.05 for pur-
chase of raw materials, which sums correspond to sum detailed 
on defendant's statement to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. 
(Ex. 8-P) . Again, neither Nickles nor his wife could make 
any satisfactory explanation of the contradictions of the 
testimony at this trial and the affidavits filed in the fed-
eral court proceeding, but said in effect that their lawyers 
and accountant were confused (R. 133). At the very least, 
however, plaintiff's exhibit to its complaint (Ex. 22-D) con-
stitutes an admission of liability to defendant for the pur-
chases, for which the $3,300.00 was paid. 
Defendant would also refer the Court to Ex. 20-D, an 
additional affidavit made by Nickles in the federal court ac-
tion, wherein a detailed list of the material lost in the 
fire is attached. Again, Centurian Corporation is shown as 
the owner of materials used in the manufacture of boats. The 
contradiction between the testimony of Nickles at the trial 
in this matter and the other proceedings is striking and can-
not be resolved, except that on one or more occasions the 
testimony was inaccurate. 
With respect to plaintiff's dealings with defendant, 
the record below makes clear the following: 
A. Invoices were labeled both Centurian Corporation 
and Centurian Boats, Inc. and were received without objection 
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or request for clarification by plaintiff (Exs. 23-25-D). 
B. Defendant received at least one check drawn on 
the account of Centurian Corporation paying for purchases of 
raw materials (Ex. 18-D) prior to the fire in January, 1972. 
C. Fred Schwab, branch manager of defendant, did 
not know of the existence of the two corporations and assumed 
that he was dealing with one entity (R. 185). 
D. Richard Nickles admitted that confusion often 
resulted from the similarity of the names of the two compan-
ies (R. 131). 
This Court, in the case of Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 
26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971), held that one corporation 
was the alter ego of another and enforced a wage claim 
against the parent corporation incurred by its subsidiary. 
This Court stated that it would disregard the corporate fic-
tion without a showing of fraud or trickery when considerations 
of justice so required. At page 670 of the Omnico decision, 
this Court stated: 
In this situation the consideration of 
justice which so requires is simply that a 
controlling corporation such as Omnico should 
not be permitted to manage and operate a bus-
iness from which it stands to gain whatever 
profit may be made, have the advantage of the 
efforts of those who serve it, and then use 
the nomenclature of another corporation as a 
facade to insulate it from responsibility for 
paying for such services. 
While plaintiff Centurian Corporation is not the parent of 
Centurian Custom Boats, Inc., the similarities to Omnico are 
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striking since there is common ownership!, benefit and con-
trol of both corporations. 
Nickles testified, as did his wife Margaret, in ex-
planation of checks written to defendant prior to January, 
197 2, that Centurian Corporation would commonly make loans 
to Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. However, plaintiff intro-
duced nothing at the trial to demonstrate the formalities of 
loans, promissory notes, ledger entries or minutes. Conven-
iently, all such records were destroyed in the fire (R. 146). 
Nickles also testified that Centurian Corporation 
was the financing arm of Centurian Custom Boats in that it 
held the molds and leased them to Custom Boats (R. 154-55). 
If that is true, all the assets of the operation, together 
with the insurance proceeds were left in the plaintiff Cen-
turian Corporation and Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. was left 
as a bankrupt and dissolved corporate shell, the result of 
which is that defendant, like the wage claimant in Omnico, 
would be left with a useless judgment. 
The trial court, while admitting and hearing the evi-
dence, held that the Omnico decision required evidence of 
fraud or trickery which it found to be absent in this action. 
The Omnico decision does not so require, but requires a mer-
ger of corporate identity resulting in injustice to creditors. 
Defendant met that burden at trial. 
The trial court found and held as a bar to defendant's 
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claim of alter ego and course of dealing defendant's knowl-
edge that Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. had ceased doing 
business as of January, 1972. This finding is irrelevant 
to the issues of the lawsuit. Fred Schwab testified that 
he was not aware two corporations were in existence. 
The equitable doctrine of alter ego, or the pierc-
ing of the corporate veil, was developed very early by the 
courts to combat abuses of corporations. The disregard of 
corporate status is transactional; that is, it does not op-
erate to dissolve the corporation, rather it binds either a 
shareholder or another corporation to its acts. The remedy 
is equitable and therefore both a trial court and appellate 
court have great latitude and discretion in finding fact and 
formulating a remedy. See Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. Ed.) 
§ 41 et seq.; O'Neal, Close Corporations (Perm. Ed.) I 1 et 
seq.; 46 ALR 3d 428. 
This Court is not unfamiliar with the equitable doc-
trine and has decided a number of cases dealing with the dis-
regard of corporateness or alter ego. While the Omnico de-
cision, supra, is the nearest in point, the cases of Omoss v. 
Bennion, 18 Utah 2d 251, 420 P,2d 47 (1966); Stine v. Girola, 
9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959); Western Securities Co. v. 
Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 P. 856 (1923) look at the transaction 
course of dealing involved and do not require fraud or trick-
ery nor hold the aggrieved party to duties arising, if at all 
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at law, but not in equity. 
In Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, supra, the de-
fendant in an action to recover on notes, asserted that the 
plaintiff corporation was the alter ego of its sole share-
holder. The trial court agreed, and this Court affirmed. 
The evidence adduced at that trial showed that the share-
holder used the corporation for his personal business and 
commingled assets and funds. The opinion of the court speaks 
not in terms of fraud or trickery but in terms of real party 
in interest as disregarding the corporate entity. 
The trial court below, by its denial of the defense 
ignores the equitable nature of the relief requested and the 
conduct of the parties, and in particular the perfidious use 
of Centurian Custom Boats, Inc. by the plaintiff. Defendant 
can find no cases or statutory authority supporting the prop-
osition that it had a duty to ascertain the existence of two 
corporations. The thrust of the equitable doctrine of alter 
ego and piercing corporate veils is that of the conduct of 
the parties, the real intent, the real party in interest and 
in doing equity. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT A CONTRACT WAS 
ENTERED INTO FOR THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF GOODS 
FOR WHICH THE CHECK WAS CONSIDERATION IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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The trial court found that a contract for the pur-
chase and sale of raw materials in the amount of $3,300.00 
was made by and between plaintiff and defendant. Richard 
Nickles testified that after the fire which destroyed the 
manufacturing operation conducted by Centurian Custom Boats, 
Inc., Centurian Corporation decided to enter that business 
and engage in manufacturing. Notably that was after Centur-
ian Corporation filed a claim for all the proceeds under the 
fire insurance policies. In any event, he alleged he con-
tacted Fred Schwab regarding the purchase, and a decision 
was made as to prices and commodities. The only evidence 
aside from the testimony of Nickles is the check voucher pro-
duced at the trial by plaintiff containing a list of goods 
adding up to approximately $3,300.00, a coincidental figure 
with what was owed to defendant. Nickles testified that af-
ter a period of time he brought the action for defendant's 
failure to deliver. 
Fred Schwab, the branch manager at Fiberchem, tells 
an entirely different version. Schwab testified that from the 
time of the fire until July of 1973, he made every reasonable 
attempt to collect the $3,300.00 owed by Centurian Custom 
Boats to defendant. Schwab stated that due to the reported 
fire and financial difficulties described by Nickles, the 
head office finally decided to give up collection attempts as 
fruitless and write the debt off. 
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Schwab, just prior to August 1, 1973, had renewed 
conversations with Nickles regarding the debt. Nickles 
told Schwab that he would pay the debt if Schwab would "dum-
my an invoice" (R. 183). This Schwab refused to do. Nickles 
finally acquiesced, and on August 1, 1973, delivered a check 
to defendant's office. Schwab testified that there was no 
discussion of materials and the check was payment on account. 
As far as he knew, Centurian Corporation manufactured the Cen-
turian Boat and there was one business. Nickles' testimony 
when laid against Schwab's is either believable or it is not. 
Both cannot be truthful in their testimony. Apparently in 
the face of constant impeachment, Richard Nickles' prior con-
viction for felonious mail fraud tR. 14(^ ) , the trial court 
chose to believe Nickles. 
Defendant elsewhere at the trial1 demonstrated that 
Nickles not only had motive to hide the truth, but the means 
by which Nickles utilized the corporations not only in this 
action but in the prior actions as well.i These are harsh 
words, but deliberately chosen. Defendant is well aware of 
the scope of review this Court may exercise in reviewing the 
findings of the trial court but must urge that the testimony 
of Richard Nickles was riddled with inconsistencies both 
internally and when viewed against his prior testimony, to 
which defendant has directed the Court's attention. There 
can be no balance or harmony struck between the testimony of 
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the two men. The trial court, in view of the record in this 
matter, found the making of the contract erroneously. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to an order of this Court va-
cating the judgment reached herein and for whatever further 
relief or proceedings this Court deems proper. 
Michael F. Hey^ f^id 
225 South Second East 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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